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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions
have had a dramatic effect on domestic violence prosecution through-
out the United States, sparking debate about possible solutions to an
increasingly difficult trial process for prosecutors and the survivors
they represent. In this Note, I revisit and reinterpret the suggestion by
Professor Sherman J. Clark in his article, An Accuser-Obligation
Approach to the Confrontation Clause,1 that we should view the
Confrontation Clause primarily as an obligation of the accuser
rather than a right of the accused. Specifically, I reevaluate Clark’s
proposition using a gendered lens, ultimately suggesting a novel solu-
tion to the problem of the “victimless” domestic violence prosecution
that would extend beyond the domestic violence context. An ap-
proach that views the Confrontation Clause as an accuser’s obliga-
tion, and focuses on the values of honor, courage, and respect, while
simultaneously taking a gender-conscious approach in defining those
values, will produce a body of jurisprudence that can satisfy the
courts, academics, and advocates alike.
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“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”2
In 2004, the Supreme Court dramatically changed its interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause. For years, courts had been using hearsay doctrine
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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as a proxy to determine whether the Confrontation Clause had been satis-
fied. Courts routinely collapsed any constitutional analysis of potential
Confrontation Clause issues with an evidentiary analysis of hearsay rules,
essentially rendering the Confrontation Clause superfluous.3 The Court’s
decision in Crawford v. Washington finally gave the Confrontation Clause
teeth.4 The Court articulated a new test to determine whether or not a
statement was admissible, decoupling it from any hearsay analysis. Now
“testimonial statements [would] only be admitted against a criminal defen-
dant when the declarant [was] unavailable and the defendant had a previous
opportunity for cross-examination.”5
This shift was incredibly problematic for domestic violence prosecu-
tions, many of which involve victims who are either unable or unwilling to
testify at trial.6 Under the Crawford analysis, key pieces of evidence in the
state’s case on which prosecutors previously relied were now excluded to
uphold the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right, making it much more
difficult to secure convictions.7 Following Crawford, advocates and scholars
began suggesting unique solutions to avoid these new Confrontation Clause
issues, enabling prosecutors to secure domestic violence convictions in cases
where the victim declines to testify.8 Subsequent research shows that the
lower courts have found their own inventive solutions to the problem, en-
3. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1259–60.
4. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. Eleanor Simon, Confrontation and Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There and Should
There Be a Doctrinal Exception?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 179 (2011); Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 68.
6. Simon, supra note 5, at 185.
[O]ften the only witnesses to [domestic violence] will be the victim and the
defendant. The high likelihood both that victims will refuse to cooperate
and that there will be no other witnesses often requires prosecutors to rely
primarily on hearsay evidence. This type of hearsay evidence generally con-
sists of 911 emergency calls, verbal statements given by the victim to the
police upon their arrival at the scene, and written statements given by the
victim, such as affidavits or civil restraining orders. Under the formally ob-
solete Roberts framework, these types of out-of-court statements were rou-
tinely admitted without the presence of the declarant in court, thus
enabling domestic violence prosecutions to proceed. Under the new Craw-
ford framework, however, if these statements are deemed testimonial (and
the victim has in fact chosen not to testify), then their admission would be
barred as a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part IV.
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suring that these “victimless”9 domestic violence prosecutions still have a
chance of success.10
In this Note, I revisit the work of Professor Sherman J. Clark, who in
2003 proposed that we look at the Confrontation Clause “not solely as a
right enjoyed by criminal defendants, but also, even primarily, as an obliga-
tion imposed upon would-be witnesses.”11 An essential first step toward
reaching a more satisfying solution to the problem of “victimless” domestic
violence prosecutions is to refocus the Confrontation Clause as an obliga-
tion imposed on the accuser. The accuser-obligation approach forces us to
consider what we as a society deem acceptable.12 Clark understandably em-
phasizes the confrontation aspect of the Clause,13 but necessary to his ap-
proach is an evaluation of the concepts of honor, courage, and respect.14
Though his focus on the social values reflected in the Confrontation Clause
is appropriately placed, Clark fails to account for his own masculine concep-
tion of those values. I present a novel solution to the problem by drawing
on feminist theory and viewing Clark’s work through a gendered lens,
9. For convenience, I use the term “victimless” prosecutions throughout this Note. I am
not doing so because I think “victimless” is the best way to describe these cases. It is,
however, a part of the discourse, and the most common nomenclature used to refer
to prosecutions that proceed without the testimony of the victim. For a further dis-
cussion on the problematic aspects of the term, see infra note 89 and accompanying
text.
10. See infra Part IV.E.
11. Clark, supra note 1, at 1261.
12. I use the terms “we” and “us” throughout this Note to refer to American people
generally, and the dominant cultural norms to which they subscribe. America is an
incredibly diverse country with a wide range of cultural influences. Consequently,
many people do not subscribe to all, or in some cases any, of the interpretations of
the values discussed in this Note. I am not claiming that “we” refers to each and
every member of our society.
13. Clark, supra note 1, at 1270.
I have argued elsewhere that the criminal trial jury can be understood in
part as an institution through which each of us in turn are forced to face, to
confront, the difficult and troubling thing we do when we judge another.
Here my point is that we might expect that those who would ask us to take
that step—who would claim to provide the grounds for our judgment—
should be willing to do the same.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., id. at 1271 (“[I]t is manifestly not problematic to act as nobly as we are
able, in the belief that those occasions of honorable behavior, however rare, say some-
thing important about who we really are.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1259 (“[T]he
Confrontation Clause, on this reading, focuses on whether [the testimony] is worthy
of respect.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1281 (“At some level, the traumatized child
victim differs only in degree from the adult witness who lacks the courage to confront
those he or she would accuse.” (emphasis added)).
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reaching a new understanding of the Confrontation Clause that can be ap-
plied outside of the domestic violence context.
A gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach challenges masculine
conceptions of honor, courage, and respect—values that are reflected in,
and shaped by, the Clause. It will produce better outcomes not only in
“victimless” domestic violence cases but in all cases. The accuser-obligation
approach recognizes the power of the law to “both reflect and constitute
community identity and self-perception,”15 helping to shape the very fabric
of society.16 This approach, coupled with a gender-conscious understanding
of our own values that accounts for both masculine and feminine perspec-
tives,17 will produce a coherent body of jurisprudence which can be effec-
tively and consistently applied by the lower courts while simultaneously
allowing the values reflected in the Clause to better serve as societal ideals.
Part I of this Note provides a history of both the ancient roots of the
Confrontation Clause and its modern interpretation. Part II highlights the
prevalence of domestic violence in the United States. Part III details the
issues surrounding domestic violence prosecutions since Crawford and re-
sponses from within the criminal justice system. Some of the solutions pre-
viously proposed to address the issues highlighted in Part III are presented
in greater detail in Part IV. Part V then reinterprets the accuser-obligation
approach using a gendered lens. Finally, Part VI highlights how the gender-
conscious accuser-obligation approach provides a novel solution to the
problems raised in Part III that, unlike those presented in Part IV, will
produce better outcomes not only in “victimless” domestic violence cases,
but in all cases.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Ancient and Common Law Origins
The origins of the Confrontation Clause can be traced back to well
before the founding of the United States and the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment.18 As the Supreme Court and scholars have noted, the right to
15. Id. at 1259
16. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
20, 58–59 (1988) (noting that legal decisions make “statement[s] about the kind of
world we live in and want to live in.”).
17. When I use the terms masculine and feminine, I am referring to the culturally domi-
nant forms of masculinity and femininity at any given time, also known as hege-
monic masculinity and femininity. For a further explanation of hegemony, see infra
Part V.C.
18. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 561 U.S. 36, 43 (“The right to confront one’s
accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times.”).
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confrontation has ancient roots.19 A detailed discussion on the long history
of the Confrontation Clause is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.20
Relevant to this discussion is the fact that masculine voices often dominated
the legal discourse in the ancient systems in which the right developed.21
More directly relevant is the common law origin of the right to con-
frontation, most often attributed to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in En-
gland in 1603.22 During Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason, the evidence
against him was drawn from the out-of-court statements of a supposed ac-
complice.23 Sir Raleigh demanded much less than defendants do today, re-
questing, as was common at the time, that the accuser merely be present in
court.24 Much to his surprise, the request was denied.25 As a response to the
19. See, e.g., Crawford, 561 U.S. at 43; Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. & Brownlow M. Speer,
Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34
VA. J. INT’L L. 481 (1994).
20. For an in-depth discussion regarding the ancient origins of the Confrontation Clause
and its acknowledgement by the Supreme Court, see Herrmann & Speer, supra note
19, at 483–84:
The principle of confrontation, in the sense of the right of defendants to
have accusing witnesses produced before them, developed along three main
lines, each originating in Roman law. First, legislation of the Emperor Jus-
tinian in the year 539 provided the normative foundation of the right of
witness confrontation. This norm derived from preexisting practice and was
based on the heightened necessity for accurate fact-finding in criminal
cases. Second, Pope Gregory I emphasized the guarantee of fundamentally
fair procedures to an accused person when he applied Justinian’s legislation
in the year 603. Finally, the great pseudoisidorean forgeries of the mid-
ninth century initiated a third line of development by creating a powerful
defense tool to ward off unfair accusations and unreliable testimony.
Id.
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BAUMAN, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN ANCIENT ROME 1–2
(Taylor & Francis eds., 2003) (“Although enjoying considerable social mobility
under the influence of Etruscan and Hellenistic ideas, and gradually achieving a large
measure of independence under private law, women were at a permanent disadvan-
tage in the public sector. They were rigorously excluded from all official participa-
tion in public affairs . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Herrmann & Speer, supra note 19, at 481–82 (“When Sir Walter Raleigh
demanded to meet the witness against him ‘face-to-face’ at his trial for treason in
1603, the English court rejected his request as having no foundation in the common
law. Conventional wisdom marks Raleigh’s rejected demand as the starting point of
the history of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause . . . .”).
23. Id. at 545.
24. Id.
25. Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to Hear-
say Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 745
(2008).
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“gross procedural abuses”26 suffered by Sir Raleigh, the common law finally
named the right of confrontation, a right which had been present in western
culture for ages.27
B. Modern Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence
1. The Roberts Era
The seminal case addressing the Confrontation Clause prior to Craw-
ford was Ohio v. Roberts.28 In Roberts, the Court set forth a two-part test that
bound Confrontation Clause doctrine to the rules against hearsay. First,
prosecutors had to prove that the witness was unavailable to testify. Once
this was established, the prosecution then had to show that the statement
was marked by an “indicia of reliability.”29 In order to demonstrate such
reliability, the prosecutor needed merely to point to a “firmly rooted hearsay
exception,” or, should no such exception exist, show that the statement had
a “particularized guarantee[ ] of trustworthiness.”30 This test left the Con-
frontation Clause without teeth, as the Court would subsequently find only
two hearsay exceptions to lack firm roots: the residual hearsay exception and
the exception for an accomplice’s custodial confession.31
Though the Roberts analysis drew its fair share of criticism from aca-
demics and judges,32 the Court allowed it to reign for over twenty years.
One particularly vocal critic who eventually influenced the Court was Pro-
fessor Richard Friedman, an expert on both evidence and U.S. Supreme
Court history. As early as 1997, he noted the “virtually superfluous role that
26. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L.
REV. 863, 873 (1988).
27. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 19, at 482.
28. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
29. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66.
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66.
31. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 758
(2005). The residual hearsay exception was found to lack firm roots because its ex-
clusive purpose is to cover unusual hearsay that falls outside the scope of the tradi-
tional exceptions. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).  An accomplice’s
custodial confessions were considered to be inherently unreliable given the incentive
one has in betraying a fellow accused and the government’s involvement in their
production, thus raising core hearsay concerns. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,
131–34 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140–43 (Breyer, J., concurring); John L.
Ross, Confrontation and Residual Hearsay: A Critical Examination, and a Proposal for
Military Courts, 118 MIL. L. REV. 31, 60–62 (1987); William S. Pitman, Note,
Baker v. Morris and the Right? to Confrontation, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 839
(1987).
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the Confrontation Clause had come to play.”33 It had become “simply a
formality” because the courts routinely considered it satisfied if an exception
to the hearsay requirement could be cited.34 The Crawford Court cited
Friedman when the Roberts analysis was finally laid to rest and the Confron-
tation Clause began to play a more important role in criminal
prosecutions.35
2. Crawford and the Focus on Testimonial Statements
In 2004, the Supreme Court abandoned the two-part Roberts test, de-
claring that the Sixth Amendment primarily concerned “testimonial” state-
ments.36 With Crawford, the Court established a new rule: “[T]estimonial
statements may only be admitted against a criminal defendant when the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a previous opportunity for
cross-examination.”37 According to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Crawford, “the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimo-
nial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was un-
available to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”38
Though the majority felt the outcomes of the Court’s prior decisions
had “remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding”39 of the Confronta-
tion Clause, they were willing to admit their rationales had not.40 The
Court acknowledged two ways in which the Roberts test had “depart[ed]
from [ ] historical principles:”
First, it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis
whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This
often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far
removed from the core concerns of the Clause. At the same time,
however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of
reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against
paradigmatic confrontation violations.41
33. Lininger, supra note 31, at 759–60 (citing Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and
the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 509–10 (1997)).
34. Id. at 760.
35. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
36. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
37. Simon, supra note 5.
38. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
40. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
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While critics of the Roberts analysis were surely pleased to see its end,
the Crawford opinion left a pressing question—what statements are
testimonial?42
3. Defining Testimonial post-Crawford
The Supreme Court having “le[ft] for another day any effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’ ”43 lower courts faced, as
anticipated,44 a level of uncertainty that resulted in unpredictable judg-
ments. The Court addressed the Confrontation Clause two years later in
Davis v. Washington.45 Davis was a consolidation of two cases involving do-
mestic violence: Davis v. Washington46 and Hammon v. State.47 Both cen-
tered on statements made to law enforcement personnel. The victim in
Davis spoke to a 911 operator while involved in a domestic disturbance,48
while the victim in Hammon spoke directly with law enforcement personnel
who were responding to a domestic disturbance complaint.49According to
the Davis majority:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of po-
lice interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assis-
tance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongo-
ing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interroga-
tion is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.50
While still refusing to “produce an exhaustive classification of all con-
ceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to po-
lice interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial,”51 the majority
deemed the statements in Davis to be nontestimonial and therefore admissi-
42. See, e.g., Jeanine Percival, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 216 (2005)
(“[T]he Court failed to explain what types of statements are testimonial, so it is
unclear under what circumstances the Crawford decision applies.”).
43. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
44. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
45. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
47. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
48. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
49. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
50. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
51. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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ble, while the statements in Hammon were considered testimonial and
therefore inadmissible.52 The Court “thus created the ‘primary purpose’ and
‘ongoing emergency’ test” by which the lower courts were to classify state-
ments made to law enforcement.53
Two years after Davis, the Court made another landmark Confronta-
tion Clause decision. In Giles v. California,54 the Court considered out-of-
court testimonial statements made by a victim of domestic violence against
the defendant, her abuser. Following her death at his hands, these state-
ments were admitted under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.55
Crawford admitted the possibility that exceptions to the testimonial rule
could be incorporated into the Confrontation Clause.56 The question before
the Court in Giles was whether forfeiture by wrongdoing was one such ex-
ception.57 Though the majority recognized that both a dying declaration
and a forfeiture by wrongdoing exception were established when the Con-
frontation Clause was adopted,58 it disagreed with the California Supreme
Court finding forfeiture when the defendant had not intended to prevent
the witness from testifying at trial.59 Instead, looking to common law cases
and treatises from the time of the founding, the Court determined that the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception applied only to cases in which “the de-
fendant had intended to prevent the witness from testifying.”60 Finding the
defendant lacking the requisite intent, the Court vacated the decision.61
The Court again addressed the Confrontation Clause in 2011, though
not in a domestic violence context. In Michigan v. Bryant,62 the Court ad-
dressed the statements of a man who was found with a fatal gunshot wound
in the abdomen.63 Police officers responding to the scene asked the victim
52. Simon, supra note 5, at 181–82.
53. Id. at 181.
54. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
55. Giles, 554 U.S. at 356–57, 359. Forfeiture by wrongdoing “permit[s] the introduc-
tion of statements of a witness who was detained or kept away by the means or
procurement of the defendant.” Id. at 359 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (“We need not decide in this
case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying
declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui
generis.”).
57. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358.
58. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358–59. Dying declarations are made by a speaker “who [is] both
on the brink of death and aware that [he is] dying.” Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
59. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358–68.
60. Giles, 554 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).
61. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377.
62. Bryant v. Michigan, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
63. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
2014] G E N D E R - C O N S C I O U S  CONFRONTATION 187
who had shot him, where it had happened, and when it had happened.64
The Court determined that the questions asked and the responses given
were primarily concerned with meeting an ongoing emergency, and were
therefore admissible under the Confrontation Clause.65 The Court empha-
sized the context-dependent nature of the analysis in determining whether
there was an ongoing emergency for the purposes of admissibility.66 In Bry-
ant, the Court determined that the nature and content of the police officers’
questions were necessary to assess the situation. As the questions’ primary
purpose was to allow the officers to meet an ongoing emergency, the state-
ments were not testimonial and admissible under Davis.67
Post-Bryant, the lower courts must ask a series of questions to deter-
mine whether admitting a statement will violate a defendant’s right under
the Confrontation Clause. First, the court must ask whether the statement
is testimonial.68 To make this determination, the court must consider the
primary purpose of the statement and whether it was made during an ongo-
ing emergency.69 When asking these questions, the court must account for
the context-dependent nature of the analysis.70 If a statement is found to be
testimonial, the court must then determine whether the statement will still
be admissible because the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.71 Finally, the court must examine
whether the statement may be admitted under an established exception to
the Clause, asking whether it was a dying declaration or the defendant’s
actions have resulted in forfeiture by wrongdoing.72
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
To truly understand how problematic modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has been for domestic violence prosecutions, it is important
to realize how pervasive domestic violence is in America. This Part provides
a sense of scope and serves as a brief introduction to the issue for those
unfamiliar with the subject.73
64. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165–66.
65. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165–67.
66. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1148 (“[T]he Michigan Supreme Court failed to appreciate
that whether an emergency exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent
inquiry.”).
67. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166–67.
68. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
69. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
70. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158.
71. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
72. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008).
73. Many advocacy groups provide resources on domestic violence. For a list of addi-
tional resources on domestic violence in America, see Domestic Violence, Dating Vio-
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Studies show that each year, over seven million men74 and women in
the United States are subjected to domestic violence.75 According to the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, nearly 30 percent of women
and 10 percent of men have experienced rape, physical violence, stalking, or
some combination of the above at the hands of an intimate partner.76 Do-
mestic violence “accounts for 20 percent of all non-fatal crime experienced
by women in this country”77 and resulted in a recorded 1,638 deaths in
2007.78 Often victims “are continually abused by the same perpetrator.”79 It
is important to note that because many survivors experience repeated inci-
dents of violence, “the number of intimate partner victimizations exceeds
the number of intimate partner victims annually.”80 Furthermore,
lence, Sexual Assault, and Stalking Resources, NAT’L TASKFORCE TO END SEXUAL &
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://4vawa.org/dvnational-state-and-lo-
cal-resources/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
74. Throughout this Note, I speak primarily about female survivors of domestic vio-
lence. It is important to recognize that men can also be, and are, subjected to domes-
tic violence. It is also true that women can, and do, commit acts of violence. I do not
mean to dismiss the very real abuse that men have suffered, or to mask the fact that
women subject others to domestic violence. However, because domestic violence
disproportionately affects women, and men represent the majority of abusers, I will
speak primarily about the paradigmatic case in which the abuser is male and the
survivor is female. DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, NISVS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2010 SUMMARY REPORT FINDINGS 1
(2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cdc_nisvs_overview
_insert_final-a.pdf; MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
(2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_
summary-a.pdf.
75. Michelle Byers, What Are the Odds: Applying the Doctrine of Chances to Domestic-
Violence Prosecutions in Massachusetts, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551, 552 (2012) (citing
DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT SHEET 2011 (2011)).
76. DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT SHEET 2012 1 (2012)
[hereinafter INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 2012], available at http://
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv_factsheet-a.pdf.
77. Simon, supra note 5, at 175 (citing Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding
Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 867 (2009)).
78. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 2012, supra note 76.
79. Byers, supra note 75 (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST.
OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NA-
TIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 39 (2000), available at https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf).
80. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
2014] G E N D E R - C O N S C I O U S  CONFRONTATION 189
“[a]ccording to the Bureau of Justice [S]tatistics’ report, between 1993 and
1998, only half of the victims of domestic violence reported the crime com-
mitted against them to the police.”81 It is widely recognized today that
“[m]ost domestic violence incidents are never reported.”82 Reasons cited for
failing to report these crimes include: belief that it was a private matter,
belief that it was a minor crime unworthy of reporting, belief that the police
would not investigate the crime if reported, a fear of reprisal by the perpe-
trator if the crime was reported, and a desire to protect the offender from
possible repercussions of reporting the crime.83
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION POST-CRAWFORD
Domestic violence is a longstanding issue, yet effective prosecution of
abusers remains a weakness of the United States criminal justice system.84
This stems largely from the decision that many survivors make either not to
report the crime,85 or, once they have reported it, to refuse to participate in
the trial process.86 Given the Court’s strengthening of the Confrontation
Clause beginning with Crawford, prosecutors have found it increasingly dif-
ficult to secure convictions absent a cooperating witness.87 Domestic vio-
lence survivors may refuse to cooperate for any number of reasons, not the
least of which is the increased risk of danger in which survivors find them-
selves should they leave an abuser during the trial process.88 These cases, in
which there is no witness to testify at trial, are often referred to as “vic-
timless” or “evidence-based” prosecutions.89
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/181867.pdf.
81. Andrew Fisk, Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: The Practical Effects of the Ruling
in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 263 (2007)
(citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000)).
82. Domestic Violence: Statistics and Facts, SAFE HORIZON, http://www.safehorizon.org/
index/what-we-do-2/domestic-violence—abuse-53/domestic-violence-statistics—
facts-195.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
83. Fisk, supra note 81, at 263–64 (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH
WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PART-
NER VIOLENCE 7 tbl.8 (2000)).
84. Simon, supra note 5, at 183–86.
85. See id.; Fisk, supra note 81; Domestic Violence: Statistics and Facts, supra note 82.
86. Simon, supra note 5, at 183–86.
87. Id.
88. Michael Vargas, Prosecuting Domestic Violence After Giles: Why A Categorical Ap-
proach to the Forfeiture Doctrine Threatens Female Autonomy, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 173, 184 (citing TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 80, at 37).
89. As noted by Deborah Tuerkheimer, both terms have limitations: “victimless prosecu-
tion tends to obscure the fact that someone was in fact victimized by the battering
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A. The Trouble with “Victimless” Prosecutions
In many domestic violence cases, the only witnesses to the crime are
the perpetrator and the victim.90 However, domestic violence survivors “are
more likely to recant prior statements or to refuse to testify than are victims
of any other crime,” and roughly “eighty percent of accusers in domestic
violence prosecutions refuse to cooperate with the government at some
point in the case.”91 Many prosecutors are therefore forced to proceed with
“victimless prosecutions,” without the survivor’s cooperation or live testi-
mony, instead relying on the survivor’s previous statements.92
Those unfamiliar with domestic violence may find it difficult to un-
derstand why survivors refuse to assist prosecutors, particularly when the
cited reason for refusal is love or something similarly abstract.93 However,
one reason that is easy for everyone to understand is survivors’ very real fear
of additional violence. Survivors are frequently threatened with further
abuse should they assist the prosecution, and studies suggest that leaving the
abuser in response to these threats places them in great danger.94 Married
female victims are “four times more likely to report being raped, assaulted,
or stalked” should they assist,95 and a woman’s “highest risk for murder is
when she attempts to leave or shortly after.”96 But fear of additional vio-
lence is not the only reason a survivor may refuse to cooperate. Other fac-
tors include: economic dependence on the abuser, emotional attachment to
the abuser, desire to keep families together, concern for children’s wellbeing,
fear that the state will remove the survivor’s children from the home, relig-
ious views of relationships, fear that the batterer or the survivor will be
deported, learned helplessness based on repeated abuse, a genuine belief that
conduct at issue in the case; evidence-based prosecution may incorrectly suggest that
the testimony of a victim is something other than evidence.” Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context”, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 711, 712 n.4 (2009). Tuerkheimer instead proposes the phrase “vic-
tim absent” prosecution to describe this situation, id., but like her I will use the
conventional phrase in order to avoid confusion.
90. Simon, supra note 5, at 185 (citing Michael Baxter, The Impact of Davis v. Washing-
ton on Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 213, 215 (2008)).
91. Vargas, supra note 88, at 183 (citations omitted).
92. Simon, supra note 5, at 185 (citing Baxter, supra note 90).
93. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 81, at 251 (“The prosecution usually lacks an eye-witness in
domestic violence crimes because love blinds the victim and usually she or he refuses
to testify.”).
94. Vargas, supra note 88 (citing TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 80, at 37).
95. Id.
96. Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. Bed-
ingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
115, 145 (2010) (citations omitted).
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no crime has occurred, cognitive and physical limitations of the survivor,
the perceived availability of social support, and the ethnicity and culture of
the survivor.97
Given the myriad reasons why a survivor may choose not to assist the
prosecution, “many state legislatures . . . fashioned special hearsay excep-
tions for cases involving domestic violence, and courts . . . liberally admit
hearsay statements by domestic violence victims.”98 Much like murder trials,
in which the victim is always unable to testify, these “victimless” or “evi-
dence-based prosecutions” rely on circumstantial evidence and hearsay in
order to secure a conviction.99 Crawford immediately cast doubt on the ad-
missibility of much of that evidence, resulting in the dismissal of many
cases.100 As noted by Deborah Tuerkheimer, “[w]hen the Court decided
Crawford . . . the immediate impact on the prosecution of domestic violence
was profound.”101 The Court’s post-Crawford decisions have not made such
prosecutions easier, as lower courts continue to struggle in applying the
ongoing-emergency test set forth in Davis.102
B. Frustration from Within: Responses of Those in the
Criminal Justice System
The lack of successful prosecutions and repeated exposure to reluctant
survivors has taken a toll on those within the criminal justice system. This is
due in part to the way our criminal justice system typically deals with do-
mestic violence, equating it with “paradigmatic non-domestic violence,”103
as “discrete”104 and “episodic,”105 when it is in fact “an ongoing pattern of
97. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 81, at 264; Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s
Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1191, 1236–40 (1993); Lininger, supra note 31, at 770.
98. Lininger, supra note 31, at 751 (citation omitted).
99. Fisk, supra note 81, at 265.
100. Id. at 265–66. For the results of surveys taken by prosecutors regarding the immedi-
ate impact of Crawford in three different states, see Lininger, supra note 31, app. 1 at
820–22.
101. Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 714–15 (citation omitted).
102. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the work of Eleanor Simon, who took a sample
of eighty-two state cases in 2011 in order to determine how the lower courts were
dealing with Confrontation Clause issues in domestic violence cases. Simon, supra
note 5, at 176 (“[S]tate court judges take a relatively expansive but unpredictable
approach to the Davis framework, allowing many testimonial statements while ex-
cluding others, with little consistency.”); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at
715–16.
103. Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its
Loss, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 726–27 (2007) (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id.
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conduct defined by both physical and non-physical manifestations of
power.”106 By treating one specific act of domestic violence like any other
isolated crime of violence—for example, a battery of one stranger by an-
other—the episodic and cyclical nature of the violence is often overlooked,
as is its function as a part of a greater system of control.107 As a result, both
prosecutors and judges have expressed frustration with survivors and the
trial process.108
However, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in United States v. Castle-
man109 provides hope that a more nuanced understanding of domestic vio-
lence may become the norm in the American judiciary. In Castleman, the
Court had to determine whether the defendant’s “misdemeanor offense of
having intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to the mother of his
child”110 qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”111 for
purposes of a federal law preventing those convicted of such crimes from
possessing firearms.112 At issue was the meaning of the phrase “the
use . . . of physical force” in the federal statute that defined misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve a circuit split over what degree of force was necessary to
trigger the federal law, whether it included crimes involving any use of force
or only those involving violent force.114
Recognizing that the common law meaning of force included offen-
sive touching,115 the Court held that Congress intended to incorporate that
meaning into the definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
106. Id. at 725.
107. Id. at 725 n.2 (quoting Dutton, supra note 97, at 1208).
108. See, e.g., Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning A Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence
Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 161 (2009) (citing Jennifer L. Hartman & Joanne
Belknap, Beyond the Gatekeepers: Court Professionals’ Self-Reported Attitudes About &
Experiences with Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Cases, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
349, 363 (2003)); Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminaliza-
tion of Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEF-
FERSON L. REV. 31, 57 (2009) (citing JENNIFER L. WHITE, CTR. FOR EDUC. ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, REPORT: A ROUNDTABLE ON THE IMPACT OF Craw-
ford on Prosecution of Domestic Violence 7 (2008), available at http://www
.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/crawford-08-roundtable-final-rpt.pdf).
109. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. __ (2014).
110. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 1) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
111. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 1) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
112. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 2–3).
113. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 3).
114. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 4).
115. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 4).
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lence.”116 The opinion is exciting because it recognizes that domestic vio-
lence “is a term of art encompassing acts that one might not characterize as
‘violent’ in a nondomestic content.”117 The Court highlighted how acts that
might not normally be thought of as especially violent, such as squeezing an
arm and causing a bruise, easily qualify as domestic violence “when the
accumulation of such acts over time can subject one intimate partner to the
other’s control.”118
While Castleman represents a great victory for domestic violence advo-
cates, and should result in fewer domestic violence victims losing their lives,
it is unclear whether it will have any effect on Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence. Castleman is a case of statutory interpretation, and the only po-
tential Constitutional issue relevant to the case was a challenge under the
Second Amendment, a challenge that was not taken up by the Court.119
Moreover, the Court noted that its interpretation would not even extend to
all statutory uses of the term domestic violence.120
Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurrence to reject the Court’s
definition of domestic violence, a definition which he felt “ig-
nore[d] . . . authorities” and instead embraced the “unconventional” views
of private organizations and the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence
Against Women.121 He felt such a move was a distortion of the law, one that
would “impoverish the language” and force Congress to “come up with a
new word . . . to denote actual domestic violence.”122
Only time will tell if the Castleman majority’s more comprehensive
understanding of domestic violence will impact the Court’s Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. If it does, it may lead to better outcomes in the per-
sistently difficult realm of domestic violence prosecutions. Even prior to
Crawford, prosecutors and other court professionals had expressed frustra-
tion with domestic violence prosecutions. According to a study funded by
the National Institute of Justice, over 30 percent of court professionals felt
domestic violence survivors actually undermined the prosecutor’s case, and
116. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 4–5).
117. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 7). The Court went on to note that
domestic violence “encompasses a range of force broader than that which constitutes
‘violence’ simpliciter.” Id. at 6 n.4.
118. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 8).
119. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 15); see also Castleman, 572 U.S. __,
__(2014) (Scalia, J. concurring) (slip op., at 11) (“This is a straightforward statu-
tory-interpretation case that the parties and the Court have needlessly
complicated.”).
120. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (slip op., at 6 n. 4).
121. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (Scalia, J. concurring) (slip op., at 8–9).
122. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014) (Scalia, J. concurring) (slip op., at 10) (emphasis
in original).
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over 50 percent believed that survivors would only testify if subpoenaed.123
Additionally, a 1995 study of prosecutors showed that most believed do-
mestic violence survivors did not cooperate fully with the prosecution.124
Crawford served only to increase these frustrations.
In 2005 Tom Lininger published an in-depth article focused on the
effects of Crawford in which he reported the results of a survey of sixty-four
prosecutor’s offices conducted in 2004 and 2005.125 His report shows just
how immediate and powerful of an impact the decision had:
In the first year after Crawford, prosecutors reported that they
were dismissing a higher number of domestic violence cases than
in the preceding years. This Article’s survey . . . found that 76
percent of the offices were more likely to dismiss domestic vio-
lence charges when the victim was unavailable or refused to co-
operate. In Dallas County, Texas, judges [were] dismissing up to
a dozen domestic violence cases per day because of evidentiary
problems related to Crawford. A public defender in the Bronx
put it this way: “When the complainant in a domestic violence
case insists she’s not coming and just wants to drop the charges,
I’ll just smile as the judge says, ‘Case dismissed.’”126
According to the same study, 65 percent of those surveyed felt Crawford
“had undermined the safety of battered women.”127
Others within the criminal justice system affirmed Lininger’s find-
ings.128 Legal professionals recognized that Crawford had “a widespread chil-
ling effect on judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement,”129 affecting all
aspects of the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence. Law
enforcement officers, believing an effective investigation would inevitably
lead to “testimonial” statements from the survivor,130 began bringing
charges less frequently when they “determine[d] that a victim [was] unlikely
123. Rutledge, supra note 108 (citation omitted).
124. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 869 (2009) (citing Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution
Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 190 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1996)).
125. Lininger, supra note 31.
126. Id. at 772–73 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 821.
128. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 108 (citing WHITE, supra note 108, at 13).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 57–58.
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to testify.”131 Even when law enforcement officers brought charges that were
subsequently pursued by the prosecutors’ office, some judges began to dis-
miss cases without a cooperating survivor under the assumption that there
could not possibly be enough admissible evidence to warrant a
conviction.132
Though the response of law enforcement officers and judges is alarm-
ing, the response of prosecutors is perhaps most troubling. Budget and time
constraints force prosecutors to be selective about which cases they pur-
sue.133 Unsure of their ability to obtain a conviction absent live, in-court
testimony, prosecutors became reluctant to try domestic violence cases with-
out a cooperating survivor, or with a survivor they deemed unreliable.134
Even in jurisdictions that had “no drop” policies in place requiring prosecu-
tors to bring charges in all domestic violence cases,135 Crawford still posed
problems. Prosecutors are less likely to vigorously prosecute a case they are
not confident they will win,136 and with Crawford and the Court’s subse-
quent Confrontation Clause cases casting doubt on the admissibility of sur-
vivors’ out-of-court statements, prosecutors felt pressured to offer
defendants plea bargains or reduce the charges.137 The decrease in successful
prosecutions absent a testifying survivor further chilled law enforcement’s
motivation to investigate and bring domestic violence charges in those
instances.138
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
Academics and advocates proposed a number of different solutions to
address the prosecutorial difficulties in domestic violence cases post-Craw-
ford. This Part highlights some of those, from the most common to the
more radical. All of these solutions are limited in their effectiveness because
they are bound by the logic laid out in Crawford. Most of them search for
alternative answers to the questions courts must ask under Crawford and its
progeny—a task which has proven difficult. Using Clark’s accuser-obliga-
tion model, which shifts our understanding of the Confrontation Clause
131. Id. at 57.
132. Id.
133. Percival, supra note 42, at 238.
134. Sack, supra note 108 (citing WHITE, supra note 108, at 13).
135. Simon, supra note 5, at 184.
136. See Percival, supra note 42, at 238.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 239 (“[W]hen prosecution success rates decrease, law enforcement officers
lose their motivation to target domestic violence ardently, as it becomes more and
more evident that their efforts do not translate into more batterers being prose-
cuted.”); Sack, supra note 108, at 57–58 (citing WHITE, supra note 108, at 13).
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from a right of the accused to an obligation of the accuser, we are able to ask
a completely different set of questions regarding the admissibility of evi-
dence. This allows us to avoid many of the issues raised by the solutions
discussed below.
A. Expansion of the Forfeiture Doctrine
Forfeiture by wrongdoing refers to the common law exception to the
confrontation right that, “when defendants seek to undermine the judicial
process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the
Sixth amendment does not require courts to acquiesce.”139 The Court in
Crawford recognized this historical exception as “extinguish[ing] confronta-
tion claims on essentially equitable grounds . . . .”140 Expansion of the doc-
trine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in domestic violence prosecutions was
perhaps the most frequently suggested solution post-Crawford.141 The argu-
ment for its expansion was premised on courts both recognizing and ac-
counting for the fact that individual acts of domestic violence are typically
part of a system of abuse and control,142 and that ultimately “a batterer’s
conduct over time . . . cause[s] the victim’s unavailability.”143 In many bat-
tering relationships, “[a]buse occurring prior to or during the crime for
which the defendant is being tried often functions to undermine a victim’s
willingness to cooperate with prosecutorial efforts.”144 Therefore, defendants
in domestic violence cases would satisfy the test for forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing in most cases, even if the prosecution failed to show specific misconduct
occurring after the events of the charged crime.145
In Davis, the Court hinted that such a nuanced understanding of for-
feiture in the domestic violence context might in fact be appropriate.146 The
Court recognized domestic violence as the “type of crime” which is “notori-
139. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
140. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
141. See, e.g., Rebecca McKinstry, “An Exercise in Fiction”: The Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, and Domestic Violence in Davis v. Washing-
ton, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 531 (2007); Tuerkheimer, supra note 89; Monica
Vozakis, Constitutional Law-The Confrontation Clause and the New “Primary Purpose
Test” in Domestic Violence Cases; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), 7
WYO. L. REV. 605 (2007); Ellen Liang Yee, Forfeiture of the Confrontation Right in
Giles: Justice Scalia’s Faint-Hearted Fidelity to the Common Law, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1495 (2010).
142. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 103, at 725 n.2 (citing Dutton, supra note 97, at 1208).
143. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Con-
frontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2006).
144. Id. at 47.
145. Id. at 52–56.
146. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
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ously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she
does not testify at trial.”147 Though the Court recognized this aspect of
domestic violence and acknowledged that the Sixth amendment did not
require courts to permit defendants to silence their victims, it cautioned that
it “may not . . . vitiate constitutional guarantees [even] when they have the
effect of allowing the guilty to go free.”148 This dictum was seen as “signal-
ing an inclination to embrace a robust forfeiture doctrine.”149 Advocates
encouraged prosecutors to “utilize the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing
to circumvent the Confrontation Clause altogether,” leaving them “better
able to successfully prosecute abusers without the assistance of victims in the
courtroom.”150
Two years later, Giles seemed to restrict application of the forfeiture
doctrine in domestic violence cases by requiring a finding that the defen-
dant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at trial.151
This requirement appears to generally foreclose an expanded application of
the forfeiture doctrine that would account for past behavior of the defen-
dant and the recurring nature of domestic violence.152 Nonetheless, some
advocates have found hope in the Court’s acknowledgment of a “domestic-
violence context,”153 and continue to argue for expansion of the forfeiture
doctrine.154 The basis for this line of advocacy is that the lower courts can
view Giles as an opportunity to begin a new line of “jurisprudence informed
by the realities of battering.”155 Under this line of reasoning, Giles is simply
another opportunity to expand the use of forfeiture as a means of success-
fully prosecuting a “victimless” case. This line of advocacy may enjoy re-
newed vigor given the Court’s ruling in United States v. Castleman.156
However, as discussed in Part III.B, the extent to which that opinion will
147. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832–33.
148. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
149. Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 716.
150. McKinstry, supra note 141, at 542.
151. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008).
152. Mark Egerman, Avoiding Confrontation, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 863 (2012).
153. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377 (“The domestic-violence context is, however, relevant for a
separate reason. Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony
to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the
crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior
statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. ”).
154. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 124, at 867; Tuerkheimer, supra note 89; Yee, supra
note 141.
155. Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 731.
156. Castleman, 572 U.S. __, __(2014).
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impact future Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, indeed whether it will
even be extended to this context, remains to be seen. While this solution
remains theoretically possible, it seems overly optimistic, requiring an ex-
pansive understanding of the doctrine which runs counter to the Court’s
clear intent in Giles to limit its application.157
B. A Doctrinal Exception
Eleanor Simon suggests the Court create a doctrinal, common law
exception to the right of confrontation for domestic violence cases separate
from forfeiture.158 Although Simon recognizes the Court has shown no in-
terest in doing so,159 she highlights multiple benefits in creating such a
bright-line exception. Most importantly, she writes, it would “enable courts
to function with more consistency,” allowing prosecutors to “more fully and
reliably assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.”160 Additionally, it
would send “a clear and powerful message about the unacceptability of both
domestic violence and of intimidating victims in advance of trial.”161 In
order in invoke such an exception, the prosecution would have to prove to
the judge that the domestic violence survivor was in fact in a “classic abusive
relationship.”162
This solution’s strength lies in its simplicity—adoption of such a rule
would eliminate much of the confusion courts face in determining whether
statements are in fact admissible in a “victimless” domestic violence prose-
cution. However, its adoption remains utterly improbable. Simon admits
that the Court “affirmatively believes there should not be a doctrinal domes-
tic violence exception to confrontation.”163 In Crawford,164 Davis,165 and
again in Giles,166 the Court rejected such an approach. Absent a complete
reinterpretation of our understanding of the Confrontation Clause, the
Court has little reason to abandon its stated hostility to this solution and
adopt a doctrinal exception.167 As long as we interpret the Confrontation
157. Lininger, supra note 124, at 857.
158. See Simon, supra note 5.
159. Id. at 200.
160. Id. at 204–05.
161. Id. at 205.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 200–01 (emphasis added).
164. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (noting that the “Clause’s ultimate
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence” and that “it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee”).
165. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
166. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375–77 (2008).
167. Simon argues that this exception can be created within the Court’s current Confron-
tation Clause framework by categorically characterizing “any statements made by a
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Clause as being primarily concerned with the constitutional right of the
accused, rather than with an obligation on the accuser, the Court’s recent
precedent makes such a move highly unlikely.
C. Legislative Solutions
While many advocates feel the best approach would be a liberal appli-
cation of the forfeiture doctrine by the lower courts, others argue that im-
mediate legislative action is necessary.168 Tom Lininger was a leading
proponent of this solution. He has since gone on to argue for an expansion
of the forfeiture doctrine as a better way “to facilitate the effective prosecu-
tion of domestic violence cases,”169 but his legislative suggestions are still
worth considering. His work suggests a number of state legislative reforms
in response to Crawford.170 His proposals fall into three broad categories:
expanding the opportunities for pretrial cross-examination of hearsay de-
clarants; broadening the scope of admissible hearsay in certain circum-
stances; and enacting various measures to protect battered women before
trial and to open additional avenues of recourse for survivors outside of
traditional prosecutions.171
Lininger’s first suggestion focuses on the fact that Crawford never ex-
plicitly stated cross-examination must take place at trial.172 Because survi-
vors of domestic violence have shown a greater tendency to withdraw from
the prosecutorial process the longer it drags on, Lininger argues that early
access to cross-examination is crucial,173 and he suggests creating a number
of new opportunities for “pretrial confrontation.”174 Lininger views his sec-
ond category as a natural counterbalance to Crawford’s strengthening of the
Confrontation Clause, claiming that “[s]trong confrontation rights counter-
victim in an abusive relationship . . . [as] non-testimonial.” Simon, supra note 5, at
205. However, in doing so the Court would effectively be removing all domestic
violence cases from the basic Confrontation Clause analysis set forth in Crawford,
which declared the Confrontation Clause as primarily concerned with testimonial
statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. A categorical exclusion of all statements in the
domestic violence context, preventing the courts from determining whether any par-
ticular statement is in fact testimonial, fits only superficially within the Crawford
framework. In fact, Tom Lininger, writing in response to Crawford, claimed that to
label most statements by victims to police as nontestimonal would be “intellectually
dishonest” and “[un]true to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confronta-
tion Clause.” Lininger, supra note 31, at 819.
168. See, e.g., Vozakis, supra note 141, at 632–33.
169. Lininger, supra note 124, at 857–58.
170. Lininger, supra note 31, at 783–818.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 784.
173. Id. at 786–87.
174. Id. at 787.
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balance expansive hearsay exceptions.”175 He believes that “because confron-
tation law checks statutory hearsay law . . . they should grow in proportion
to one another,”176 and that states should therefore be liberal in expanding
the scope of admissible hearsay in light of Crawford’s strengthening of the
Clause.177 The third category includes ideas such as legislation to ensure
prompt disposition of domestic violence cases, which would ensure survi-
vors remained motivated to testify,178 thus avoiding “victimless” prosecu-
tions all together.
While these suggestions show promise, they were never intended to be
a complete solution to the problems created by Crawford. Lininger himself
recognizes that “there can be no ‘legislative fix’ for the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Constitutional law.”179 The proposed changes are meant to
alter state court procedures to “better fit the contours of the Crawford rule,”
focusing on expanding the scope of admissible hearsay in domestic violence
prosecutions,180 “maximizing constitutionally permissible opportunities to
admit reliable out-of-court statements by battered women.”181
D. Unincorporation
Mark Egerman rejects the viability of the expansion of the forfeiture
doctrine post-Giles, proposing a more radical solution—a partial
unincorporation of the Confrontation Clause.182 Egerman claims that “the
Confrontation Clause doctrine cannot coexist with effective domestic vio-
lence prosecution,”183 largely due to “the gendered assumptions underlying
the confrontation doctrine.”184
Incorporation is “[t]he process of applying the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the states by interpreting the 14th Amendment’s Due Process
Clause as encompassing those provisions.”185 While not all amendments
have been incorporated, “[n]o amendment has ever been unincorpo-
rated.”186 Unincorporation would mean the Sixth Amendment would no
longer be applied against the states in any context.187 As this has never been
175. Id. at 799.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 798.
178. Id. at 815–16.
179. Id. at 753.
180. Id. at 753–54.
181. Id. at 819.
182. Egerman, supra note 152, at 897–99.
183. Id. at 867.
184. Id.
185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 834 (9th ed. 2009).
186. Egerman, supra note 152, at 898.
187. Id. at 898.
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done before, Egerman himself recognizes it is a “foreign concept
that . . . ought to inspire incredulity and confusion.”188 Given the current
state of affairs, however, he argues that a radical approach is necessary.
While unincorporation would require “merely a court ruling,”189
Egerman operates under the assumption that the Court is unwilling to ef-
fectuate such a change. He suggests Congress could reach the same result
through jurisdiction stripping, via legislation “denying federal courts the
ability to review Confrontation Clause challenges arising from state trials of
domestic violence,”190 or direct unincorporation “using its Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five Powers.”191 Although he acknowledges the juris-
diction stripping approach is unlikely to “survive judicial scrutiny,”192 he
remains confident that direct unincorporation is permissible under Con-
gress’s Fourteenth Amendment Section Five powers.193 This reliance on the
legislature to take unprecedented action is the solution’s greatest weakness,
particularly at a time when legislative inaction is the order of the day.194
Egerman’s approach highlights just how desperate advocates are for a solu-
tion, and how little faith they have in the Court to provide one in the wake
of its recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
E. Reaching for Reform: Questionable Rulings of the Lower Courts
Perhaps the most interesting response to Crawford and the subsequent
Confrontation Clause cases has come from the lower courts themselves. In
2012, Eleanor Simon analyzed state appellate and high court decisions in
post-Davis domestic violence cases.195 Specifically, she looked “to those
cases decided that examined or discussed the Confrontation Clause issue,
not just mentioning or citing Crawford or Davis.”196 The findings showed
188. Id. at 867.
189. Id. at 899.
190. Id. at 900.
191. Id. at 901. Under this approach Congress would “issue a finding . . . that the funda-
mental Fourteenth Amendment principles of due process and equal protection are
not advanced by the incorporation of the Confrontation Clause in all cases.” Id. It
would then use its Section Five powers to “unincorporated the Confrontation Clause
in domestic violence cases, allowing states to interpret the Sixth Amendment accord-
ing to their own constitutions and their own jurisprudence.” Id. at 901–02
192. Id. at 900.
193. Id. at 901.
194. Frank James, Lawmakers In Name Only? Congress Reaches Productivity Lows, NPR
(Dec. 3, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/12/03/
248565341/lawmakers-in-name-only-congress-reaches-productivity-lows (“Congress
is headed for a record low in productivity . . . .”).
195. Simon, supra note 5.
196. Id. at 187.
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both an expansion of the Davis framework and a lack of predictability.197
Lower courts often considered statements that were “objectively testimonial
under Davis”198 as non-testimonial, or found their admission to be harmless
error on appeal.199 For example, in all cases she analyzed, Simon found that
“911 call statements were uniformly classified as non-testimonial, de-
spite . . . variances from the Davis situation and despite the arguable end of
the immediate emergency.”200 Simon sees this as possible evidence of the de
facto creation of an exception to the Confrontation Clause requirement in
domestic violence cases,201 although the lack of consistency from court to
court makes such a de facto exception ineffective.
Another explanation for this behavior is that the lower courts are try-
ing to comply with Davis as best they can, but “the impreciseness of
the . . . opinion means inevitable disagreements among reasonable judges on
what constitutes testimonial evidence.”202 In the alternative, Simon asserts
that the inconsistency is in fact the result of “judges consciously engag[ing]
in a broad reading of Davis.”203 Regardless of their reasons, it is important
to note that the lower courts are actively searching for ways to carry forward
successful “victimless” prosecutions in the wake of Crawford and the Court’s
subsequent Confrontation Clause cases. Simon’s work clarifies that it is not
only advocates and scholars pushing for change; members of the judiciary
are also searching for a solution.
V. REINTERPRETING THE ACCUSER-OBLIGATION APPROACH
Before the Supreme Court radically altered Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence with Crawford, Professor Sherman Clark published an article
entitled An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause.204 In it,
he argues that “the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment ought to
be re-understood as primarily an accuser’s obligation rather than primarily
as a defendant’s right.”205 Were the Court to adopt this understanding of
the Confrontation Clause, with its emphasis on the accuser, the lower
courts could obtain more desirable and meaningful outcomes in the major-
ity of cases. This is particularly true for “victimless” domestic violence pros-
197. Id. at 188.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 190.
201. Id. at 198.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Clark, supra note 1.
205. Id. at 1258.
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ecutions, which, as shown above, have become increasingly difficult post-
Crawford.
While Clark’s work provides a compelling understanding of the Con-
frontation Clause, he, like the Founders before him, approaches the topic
from a masculine point of view.206 His conceptions of courage, honor, and
respect place great value on face-to-face conflict.207 In doing so, he overlooks
subtler, non-confrontational acts that may also be deemed honorable, wor-
thy of our respect, and indicative of courage. In my analysis of Clark’s work
through a gendered lens, I challenge those unspoken masculine assump-
tions. This is a necessary step if the accuser obligation is to be effectively
implemented. Central to Clark’s work is the idea that the law can “both
reflect and constitute community identity and self-perception,”208 helping
to shape the very fabric of society.209 Viewing Clark’s work through a
gendered lens yields an imperative question: if the confrontation require-
ment truly is “aspirational—a notion of who we want to understand our-
selves to be,”210 shouldn’t that vision take into account both masculine and
feminine perspectives?
A. Confrontation as an Accuser’s Obligation
Clark argues that “the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
ought to be re-understood as primarily an accuser’s obligation rather than as
primarily a defendant’s right.”211 This is premised on the belief that laws
206. See Egerman, supra note 152, at 890–91.
[T]he Confrontation Clause contains a subsumed belief that evidence is
best established by a ritualistic showdown of sorts, where social equals face
off against each other. Considering that women’s perspectives and realities
were not considered during the period of these developments, it comes as
no surprise that the law did not evolve in a manner that would reflect their
interests. . . . [U]nderlying this view of the Confrontation Clause is a set of
assumptions about relationships between criminals and witnesses that is
particularly androcentric and, further, makes it inapposite for the prosecu-
tion of domestic violence.
Id.
207. See infra Part V.C. I recognize that an essential aspect of the United States legal
system is its adversarial nature. However, a shift away from conceptions of honor,
courage, and respect, all of which emphasize and value conflict between two individ-
uals, would not seriously undermine the adversarial system. Prosecutors would oc-
cupy an adversarial role vis-à-vis the defendant regardless of whether the gender-
conscious accuser-obligation approach is adopted.
208. Clark, supra note 1, at 1259.
209. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 16.
210. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
211. Id. at 1258.
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can “both reflect and constitute community identity and self-perception.”212
Because the law possesses this unique property, the Confrontation Clause
can be understood to reflect our society’s belief and desire that those who
accuse a fellow citizen will be willing to “look [the defendant] in the eye and
literally stand behind [the] accusation.”213 The Confrontation Clause is
therefore an artifact of aspiration, “a notion of who we want to understand
ourselves to be,”214 or at least who we wanted to understand ourselves to be
when it was written.
Clark draws on a variety of sources to support this aspirational reading
of the Clause, citing examples of honor, courage, and respect, which both
predate and reflect the values embodied in it.215 He cites two prominent
American icons as examples of this emblematic reading: the “straight-talking
Abraham Lincoln and [the] straight-shooting John Wayne.”216 While those
specific examples are unprecedented in the legal context, the Court has ar-
ticulated a similar idea. In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia opined, “there is some-
thing deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between
accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’”217
In an effort to explain that mysterious element of our nature, Justice Scalia
went on to “cit[e] not just previous Supreme Court opinions but also The
Bible, Shakespeare, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.”218 Scholars have subse-
quently recognized that the notion that face-to-face confrontation is essen-
tial to a fair trial stems largely from its longstanding place in our legal
tradition, rather than from an evidence-backed demonstration of its
truthfulness.219
Clark spends time unpacking Eisenhower’s quote in Coy, with particu-
lar emphasis on the following language: “[In] this country, if someone dis-
likes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind
the shadow.”220 He argues that “[t]he very language smacks of disdain for
the whispering back-stabber,” with the aforementioned back-stabber in this
case being the accuser who is unwilling to confront the defendant in
court.221 Clark also places emphasis on Biblical language from both the Old
and the New Testament. From the Old Testament he cites Deuteronomy
17:7: “The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to
212. Id. at 1259; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 16.
213. Clark, supra note 1, at 1261.
214. Id. at 1263.
215. See infra Part V.C.
216. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
217. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1988).
218. Clark, supra note 1, at 1264.
219. See, e.g., Egerman, supra note 152, at 893.
220. Clark, supra note 1, at 1265 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017–18).
221. Id. at 1266.
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death, and afterward the hands of all the people.”222 This language again
places primary emphasis on the accuser, demanding that they come forward
and confront the accused.
B. Looking through a Gendered Lens: A Feminist Tool
A gendered or gender lens is a critical thinking technique that can be
employed to uncover the assumptions lying behind an aspect of society or a
specific body of work.223 Gender scholars and queer theorists use the tech-
nique for unpacking social assumptions and determining what perspectives
may be left out of the conversation.224 Specifically, utilizing a gendered lens
highlights the ways society’s construction of gender influences the object
under study,225 allowing for reinterpretation of the object in light of another
gender’s experience. UNESCO describes gendered lenses in a way that is
particularly helpful here:
Think of a gender[ed] lens as putting on spectacles. Out of one
lens of the spectacles, you see the participation, needs and reali-
ties of women. Out of the other lens, you see the participation,
needs and realities of men. Your sight or vision is the combina-
tion of what each eye sees.226
222. Id. at 1267–68. For a detailed history and explanation of the practice of judicial
dueling, see Egerman, supra note 152, at 869–76.
223. See, e.g., Thelma McCormack, Review: The Gender Lens Series, 27 CONTEMP. SOC.
143, 143 (1998) (reviewing the Gender Lens series, the broad objectives of which
“are to make gender visible in our ordinary everyday experience and to relate this
new awareness to larger, and more familiar, systems of inequality”); Barbara A.
Cleary & Mary C. Whittemore, Gender Studies Enriches Students’ Lives, 88 ENG. J.
86, 87 (1999); Barbara J. Riseman & Myra Marx Ferree, Making Gender Visible, 60
AM. SOC. REV. 775, 777 (1995); Fiona Mackay et al., New Institutionalism Through
a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist Institution?, 31 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 573, 580
(2010); Sanjay Nagral, Teaching Surgery: Through a Gender Lens, 40 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 1835, 1835 (2005); Kalyani Menon-Sen & K. Seeta Prabhu, The Budget: A
Quick Look Through a ‘Gender Lens’, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1164, 1165 (2004).
224. See, e.g., id.; see also Sue Lafky et al., Looking Through Gendered Lenses: Female Stere-
otyping in Advertisements and Gender Role Expectations, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 379, 380 (1996) (“[L]enses of gender influence the ways individuals
socially construct reality and produce (and reproduce) gender traits. Because these
lenses of gender are embedded in social, political, and economic institutions . . . they
help to shape gender-based inequalities . . . .”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
225. See id.
226. UNITED NATIONS EDUC. SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), GENDER IN
EDUCATION NETWORK IN ASIA (GENIA): A TOOLKIT FOR PROMOTING GENDER
EQUALITY IN EDUCATION 19 (2006), available at http://unesco.org.pk/education/
life/nfer_library/Reports/4-109.pdf.
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Employing a gendered lens thus highlights the ways Clark’s formulation of
the accuser-obligation approach reflects and incorporates his own masculine
lens. The accuser-obligation approach can subsequently be altered to incor-
porate a feminine perspective, which, as I argue in this Note, provides a new
understanding of the Confrontation Clause that will produce better out-
comes in all cases.
C. The Accuser Obligation through a Gendered Lens
Clark’s masculine lens is best reflected in his conceptions of honor,
courage, and respect. Consequently, in this Note, I focus specifically on his
arguments that utilize those terms either directly or indirectly. Clark’s un-
derstanding of confrontation unites all three ideas; he views the accuser’s act
of confronting the accused as courageous, worthy of our respect, and honor-
able.227 Once one recognizes that Clark defines these three key concepts
using a masculine lens,228 they can be reinterpreted using a feminine lens.
The result is a gender-conscious conception of each of these values, provid-
ing a better understanding of the aspirations embodied in the Confronta-
tion Clause. This reinterpretation of the accuser-obligation approach
provides a novel solution to the problem of “victimless” domestic violence
prosecutions post-Crawford that is applicable to all cases.
In this Note, I use the term masculine lens to mean one that repre-
sents hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is, as implied by its
modifier, not synonymous with all forms of masculinity. Rather, it is “that
form of masculinity that is considered culturally to be most dominant at
any given time. . . .”229 Of course, hegemonic masculinity excludes feminin-
ity in addition to leaving out alternative forms of masculinity. If we are truly
to accept the Confrontation Clause as a reflection of ourselves, or at least “a
notion of who we want to understand ourselves to be,”230 we must include
in that notion the experience of our entire population, both men and
women. Such a step is both informative and necessary, especially in the
context of the criminal justice system, which has historically “been run by
men, against men, and for the benefit of men.”231 While this masculine
predisposition is “not . . . much different from the rest of society,”232 the
227. See infra Part V.C.1–3.
228. It is arguable that such a lens was almost unavoidable because “the Confrontation
Clause reflects a gendered perspective on crime.” Egerman, supra note 152, at 867.
229. Tony Coles, Negotiating the Field of Masculinity: The Production and Reproduction of
Multiple Dominant Masculinities, 12 MEN & MASCULINITIES 30, 41 (2009).
230. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
231. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2157 (1995).
232. Id.
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system’s focus on “male concerns and male perspectives”233 is more exagger-
ated than that seen in other aspects of society less dominated by men.234
Taking a gender-conscious approach is the only way we can truly under-
stand the Confrontation Clause as an obligation applicable to all would-be
accusers; we must account for the fact that not every accuser identifies as a
man.
I do not mean to accuse Clark of rampant sexism. In many ways, his
work reflects a systemic problem within our legal system—it is based on
foundations laid by men at a time when women had little to no voice in
public affairs.235 As noted by Catherine MacKinnon, “[women] had no
voice in writing the U.S. Constitution. When, one hundred years and a civil
war later, an equality provision was added in 1868, it was without any ex-
pectation that the legal status of the sexes would be affected.”236 MacKin-
non is just one of many to highlight this historical bias,237 so it comes as
little surprise that Clark, albeit unintentionally, took an androcentric238 ap-
proach in his article.
1. Honor
“Honor” appears eight times in Clark’s article.239 It is first discussed
through what it is not: It is “inconsistent with a sneaking attempt to get a
233. Id. at 2151.
234. See id. at 2157.
235. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 103 (2007).
236. Id.; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States
v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 174 (2000) (“Nothing in the design of the
system exposes the gender bias built into the history and tradition of the Constitu-
tion’s structure and doctrines. Nothing requires that women’s interests as such be
given any consideration at all.”).
237. See, e.g., Egerman, supra note 152, at 866 (“The modern practice of witness confron-
tation is inextricably tied into historic concepts of dueling, status, and honor—con-
cepts that present significant obstacles to the administration of justice under certain
circumstances. Confrontation doctrine does not represent evidence-based or logical
concerns about fact finding. Instead, confrontation is an example of ‘preservation
through transformation,’ a way that historical values about class, gender, and status
have survived into the present by burrowing themselves under a veneer of neutral-
ity.” (citations omitted)); Schulhofer, supra note 231 (“The criminal justice system
fits almost perfectly Lincoln’s conception of a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people. It fits perfectly, if you are willing to equate ‘the people’
with the male half of the population. Criminal law is—and has been for centuries—
a system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men, and against men.”).
238. Androcentric is defined as “dominated by or emphasizing masculine interests or a
masculine point of view.” Androcentric Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/androcentric (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
239. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263, 1269–71, 1273–74, 1286.
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fellow citizen sent to jail without ever looking him in the eye.”240 Inherent
in this definition of honor is the concept of confrontation. Clark contrasts
this eye-to-eye interaction with “stab[bing] a man in the back.”241 His focus
on confrontation reflects a masculine conception of self “defined through
separation,”242 a conception that consequently “views aggression as endemic
in human relationships.”243 This stands in contrast to a feminine conception
of self, one based on an “ethic of care” that often informs women’s lives and
“rests on a premise of nonviolence—that no one should be hurt”244 The
masculine conception demands conflict, and prioritizes violence over peace-
fulness.245 Violence and aggression are thus frequently regarded as mascu-
line,246 and “many members of the privileged group [i.e. men] use violence
to sustain their dominance.”247 Clark next discusses honor in relation to
respect, describing whispering as unworthy of respect and consequently dis-
honorable.248 Again this places an emphasis on confrontation; it requires the
accuser to speak loudly and directly at the accused, to draw attention to
themselves and initiate conflict.
Implicit in this argument are two premises: (1) direct confrontation is
the only way to achieve honor, and (2) a conception of honor can and
should be incorporated into criminal procedure through the Confrontation
240. Id. at 1263.
241. Id.
242. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 8 (1993) (“Since masculinity is defined through separa-
tion while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is
threatened by intimacy . . . males tend to have difficulty with relationships. . . .”).
243. Id. at 45.
244. Id. at 173–74.
245. See, e.g., Egerman supra note 152, at 866 (citation omitted) (“Our views on confron-
tation reflect a gendered understanding of crime that includes a number of implicit
androcentric assumptions. This claim goes deeper than the surface observation that
confrontation itself is a traditionally masculine response to adversity.”).
246. See, e.g., R. W. Connell, The Social Organization of Masculinity, in FEMINIST THE-
ORY READER: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 232 (Carole R. McCann &
Seung-kyung Kim eds., 2d ed. 2010) (“That is to say, an unmasculine person would
behave differently: being peaceable rather than violent, conciliatory rather than dom-
inating . . . .”); Coles, supra note 229, at 40 (“[M]en have tried to defend their
position of dominance by falling on essentialist arguments . . . i.e., that men are
genetically predisposed to masculine behavior such as aggression . . . and risk tak-
ing.”); Gender and Gender-Identity: What is Feminine? What is Masculine?, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/sexual-orientation-
gender/gender-gender-identity-26530.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) (“Words com-
monly used to describe masculinity: independent, non-emotional, aggressive, tough-
skinned, competitive, clumsy, experienced, strong, active, self-confident, hard, sexu-
ally aggressive, [and] rebellious.”).
247. Connell, supra note 246, at 241.
248. Clark, supra note 1, at 1269.
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Clause. Though Clark’s second premise is correct, his first is flawed by, and
representative of, his masculine lens. To create an accuser-obligation ap-
proach that better reflects the entirety of society, it is necessary to incorpo-
rate a definition of honor that allows for more than just direct
confrontation. Instead, the accuser-obligation approach should account for
a feminine perspective, incorporating a conception of honor that is achieva-
ble through less aggressive means.
We can and should conceive of honor in ways that do not involve
aggressive behavior.249 It is reasonable to posit a theory of honor that cele-
brates non-confrontational actions. This does not require us to suddenly
consider backstabbing to be honorable. An alternative conception of honor
could place value on speaking up where an individual is not subsequently
required to “stab” anyone, be it in the chest or the back. We can and should
choose to recognize the act of a domestic violence survivor reaching out for
help as honorable. If a survivor contacts the police, even if that survivor later
chooses to use more “subtle acts of resistance” and refuses to testify at
trial,250 we should recognize the initial act as honorable, setting aside any
subsequent refusal to participate in the trial process. This would not offend
the Confrontation Clause, understood as serving in part to prohibit the use
of dishonorable statements in court, because the honor requirement will
have already been satisfied.
2. Courage
Another key concept in Clark’s work is the notion of courage. Clark
suggests that one basis for excusing children’s inability or unwillingness to
testify under the accuser-obligation approach is that “we might not be will-
ing to demand that our children demonstrate the same fortitude [or cour-
age] we require of our fellow adults.”251 This exception highlights Clark’s
conception of courage in the negative, by describing when it is not present.
If he would excuse children from delivering live testimony due to a lack of
courage, then confronting someone directly and engaging in the combative
process that is a trial system must be emblematic of courage under his ac-
cuser-obligation approach.
249. I am not alone in the belief that the Confrontation Clause can stand for more than
one set of values, more than one conception of such an important concept as honor.
See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 96, at 154 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause can encom-
pass multiple values and interests . . . .”).
250. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 247
(2005).
251. Clark, supra note 1, at 1281.
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We need not say that one can only display courage by engaging in a
combative process; instead, we can choose to recognize courage displayed
outside of battle. Survivors of domestic violence routinely display courage
while navigating “homes . . . marked by terror.”252 Merely persevering in
such an environment should be recognized as courageous. While it is true
that these displays of courage go unwitnessed, insisting upon an in-court
confrontation only “allows the batterer to further terrorize his victim while
ignoring the ways that this might undermine [the victim’s] ability to tes-
tify.”253 An act need not be witnessed to be courageous, and we should
recognize courage outside of confrontational situations like that of deliver-
ing live, in-court testimony. Under this approach, the survivor who makes
statements to the police and engages in “subtle acts of resistance,”254 can
fulfill her obligations as an accuser under the Confrontation Clause, and
courts could allow the testimony even in her absence. This would not of-
fend Clark’s conception of Confrontation Clause, serving in part to rein-
force our conception of courage, because the accuser is acting courageously.
3. Respect
The Confrontation Clause also focuses on whether the accuser and the
testimony in question are “worthy of respect.”255 Throughout his article,
Clark claims that people who “hide from those they accuse” are not worthy
of our respect.256 He thereby makes conflict an essential component of re-
spect, just as he did with his conception of honor. Clark further argues that
respect should be a necessary prerequisite for having a statement “heard in
court,”257 as those who are “unworthy of respect”258 should not be consid-
ered at trial. Consequently, Clark seems to suggest that an individual who is
unwilling to engage in conflict is incapable of serving as an aspirational
figure, and should be silenced and barred from participation in the criminal
justice system.
We need not accept the proposition that respect can only be gained
through conflict. Such an assumption is particularly damaging if we accept
Clark’s implicit suggestion that respect is a prerequisite for simply gaining a
voice within the criminal justice system. Instead, we should embrace a con-
cept of respect that is earned in ways other than direct conflict. For example,
we should deem someone worthy of our respect if they seek assistance in a
252. Miccio, supra note 250.
253. Egerman, supra note 152, at 893 (citations omitted).
254. Miccio, supra note 250.
255. Clark, supra note 1, at 1259.
256. Id. at 1265.
257. Id. at 1278.
258. Id. at 1279.
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desperate situation, such as domestic violence.259 Similarly, we should deem
putting oneself in harm’s way in an attempt to mitigate damage to others,
something we frequently see survivors of domestic violence do,260 as worthy
of our respect. Consequently, in the majority of “victimless” domestic vio-
lence cases the Confrontation Clause, working in part to ensure that accus-
ers are in fact worthy of our respect, would not be offended by allowing a
survivor’s testimony at trial, even in her absence.
VI. THE GENDER-CONSCIOUS ACCUSER OBLIGATION:
A MORE SATISFYING SOLUTION
This Note only scratches the surface of how our conceptions of mas-
culinity and femininity shape and influence our perspectives and under-
standing of society and its values, and the subsequent impact those
perspectives and values have in shaping our legal system. The accuser-obli-
gation model can be reinterpreted to include gender-conscious conceptions
of honor, courage, and respect. To effectively implement the gender-con-
scious accuser-obligation approach in a way that reflects and constitutes our
community identity, we must have a comprehensive understanding of our
societal values. Formulating the gender-conscious accuser-obligation ap-
proach is not only an interesting exercise in feminist theory; it also provides
a more satisfying solution for the problems currently plaguing “victimless”
domestic violence prosecutions. Using the gender-conscious accuser-obliga-
tion approach would produce the outcome advocates and courts desire, al-
lowing more evidence to be admitted absent the accusers’ in-court
testimony. It would greatly relieve the burdens faced in most “victimless”
domestic violence prosecutions, while simultaneously reflecting a version of
ourselves that we do in fact “want to understand ourselves to be.”261
At the core of the accuser-obligation model lies a simple contention—
the law has power to “both reflect and constitute community identity and
self-perception,”262 helping to shape the very fabric of society. Further, the
focus of the Confrontation Clause’s reflective and constitutive powers
should lie on the accuser, rather than the accused.263 Under the Court’s
current jurisprudence, the Confrontation Clause is doing very little to posi-
tively constitute our identity. Take for example the case of Giles.264 Dwayne
259. For a brief overview on the scope and severity of domestic violence in America see
supra Part II.
260. See Dutton, supra note 97, at 1234.
261. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
262. Id. at 1259.
263. Id. at 1266.
264. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
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Giles was convicted of murder for shooting Brenda Avie outside her grand-
mother’s home. Less than a month before the shooting, Avie had spoken to
police about the domestic violence she claimed to have suffered at Giles’s
hands.265 The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, taking issue with the
lower court’s formulation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.266 As
Chief Justice Roberts noted at oral argument, the accused actually received a
great benefit for causing the accuser’s death under the Court’s interpretation
of the rule,267 sending the perverse message to the potentially accused that it
is better to kill than simply injure a potential accuser. Such a message can
hardly be deemed “aspirational.”268
Applying the gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach to the
facts of Giles produces a very different result. Shifting the focus from the
accused, we ask whether the accuser, in making her accusations, was behav-
ing in a way that was honorable, courageous, and worthy of our respect. I
argue that a domestic violence survivor speaking out about her abuse under
any circumstances is honorable, but at the very least, we should be able to
accept that a survivor speaking to police about a threat to her life is not
dishonorable. It follows that Avie was acting honorably when speaking with
police about the abuse she suffered at Giles’s hands. Likewise, we can con-
ceive of such an action as courageous given the very real risk of violence that
survivors face,269 particularly when cooperating with law  enforcement.270 A
survivor such as Avie who speaks out is therefore a paragon of courage.
Finally, we consider whether her actions were worthy of our respect. Avie
was a survivor seeking assistance; surely her actions were worthy of our
respect.
In summary, Avie, in providing her statements to the police, was act-
ing honorably, courageously, and in a manner worthy of our respect. Under
the gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach, her statements conse-
quently raise no Confrontation Clause issues. This completely avoids any
discussion of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and would allow the
verdict of the lower court to stand.
I recognize that adoption of the gender-conscious accuser-obligation
approach would be a radical step for this Court, and is unlikely to occur in
the near future. However, it does provide a novel solution to the problem of
“victimless” domestic violence prosecutions, an issue that has yet to be re-
265. Giles, 554 U.S. at 356–57.
266. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377.
267. Lininger, supra note 124, at 864 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Giles,
554 U.S. 353 (No. 07-6053)).
268. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
269. See supra Part II.
270. Vargas, supra note 88 (citing TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 80, at 37).
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solved. As shown by the lower courts’ questionable rulings in these cases,271
such a solution is necessary. It is not only about putting more abusers be-
hind bars; a coherent understanding of the Confrontation Clause will avoid
future acts of “intellectual[ ] dishonest[y]”272 on the part of state judges. As
such, it is a solution that reaches beyond the domestic violence context. The
gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach better reflects and utilizes the
law’s constitutive powers, providing a better understanding of who we
“want to understand ourselves to be.”273 That understanding is valuable re-
gardless of the substance matter of the case. This Note does not intention-
ally exclude hypothetical examples of the gender-conscious accuser-
obligation approach in other contexts; they are simply beyond its scope. The
approach would be beneficial in any context, as it is always better to account
for both masculine and feminine perspectives when constructing the cul-
tural ideals to which we subscribe.
This versatility is perhaps the approach’s greatest strength. Unlike an
expansion of the forfeiture doctrine,274 it is not primarily concerned with, or
limited to, the domestic violence context.275 Further, the Court has signaled
a desire to limit the application of the forfeiture doctrine,276 whereas the
gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach, while radical, currently faces
no open hostility. A doctrinal exception for domestic violence277 is limited
by the same specificity, in that it too is focused only on the domestic vio-
lence context. More so than in regards to the forfeiture doctrine, the Court
has shown no interest in creating such a categorical exception.278 Though
such an exception would allow the courts to “function with more consis-
tency,”279 so too would the gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach.
And unlike a categorical exception, the gender-conscious accuser-obligation
approach is applicable outside the domestic violence context. While it is a
more radical solution than those discussed above, it is more moderate than
partial unincorporation.280 The gender-conscious accuser-obligation ap-
proach asks the Court to shift its understanding of the principles underlying
the Confrontation Clause, but this is not unprecedented, as Crawford itself
271. See supra Part IV.E.
272. Lininger, supra note 31, at 818–19.
273. Clark, supra note 1, at 1263.
274. See supra Part IV.A.
275. For arguments in favor of approaches designed specifically to protect domestic vio-
lence victims, see, for example, Lininger, supra note 124; Tuerkheimer, supra note
89; Yee, supra note 141.
276. Lininger, supra note 124, at 857.
277. See supra Part IV.B.
278. Simon, supra note 5, at 200.
279. Id. at 204–05.
280. See supra Part IV.D.
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was a monumental shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.281 Finally,
unlike proposed legislative solutions,282 the gender-conscious accuser-obliga-
tion approach is a complete solution which the Court itself can implement.
CONCLUSION
As it is currently understood, the Confrontation Clause “is inherently
at odds with a legal regime that effectively prosecutes domestic violence.”283
By continuing to uphold a doctrine that undermines effective prosecution
of an entire subset of crime, “public trust in the system is destroyed.”284 The
gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach provides a solution to the
Confrontation Clause problem that should satisfy academics, advocates,
prosecutors, and judges alike. With so many groups seeking change, and
with such a widespread and serious issue at stake, it is crucial that we under-
stand the Confrontation Clause in a way that produces better outcomes.
Those outcomes should not be limited to the domestic violence context—
instead, we should utilize the potential of the Confrontation Clause to
“both reflect and constitute community identity and self-perception,”285
providing a clearer vision of “who we want to understand ourselves to
be.”286
While such an interpretation of the Clause is a radical approach un-
likely to be adopted by the Court, it effectively grapples with the world in
which we live. Domestic violence remains prevalent in America even as
prosecutors try in earnest to effectively prosecute batterers. While this Note
focuses on domestic violence as a reason for adopting a revised accuser-
obligation approach, the doctrine itself would not be limited to domestic
violence cases. The accuser-obligation approach is an effective way to under-
stand the Confrontation Clause in all cases. The law’s reflective and consti-
tutive powers are applicable in all contexts, and consequently, a gender-
conscious understanding of the Confrontation Clause that focuses on the
accuser is valuable in all cases.
281. See supra Part I.B.
282. See supra Part IV.C.
283. Egerman, supra note 152, at 890.
284. Yee, supra note 25, at 784. It is also important to note that some advocates have
argued that women’s autonomy is undermined by states that continue to pursue
convictions even when a victim chooses not to cooperate. See, e.g., Miccio, supra
note 250; Vargas, supra note 88. While I recognize those concerns, I believe it is
important to remember that “[t]he government, not the victim, is the plaintiff in
prosecutions of domestic violence. The state has a duty to seek punishment of batter-
ers, irrespective of whether the victims are willing to cooperate in prosecuting their
assailants.” Lininger, supra note 124, at 783.
285. Clark, supra note 1, at 1259.
286. Id.; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 16.
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We deserve an understanding of the Confrontation Clause that takes
into account the lived experiences and perspectives of both men and
women, an understanding that can serve as an inspiration to all of us. More-
over, we deserve an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that will
produce a coherent body of jurisprudence that can be effectively applied by
the lower courts. The gender-conscious accuser-obligation approach gives us
just that.

